CSE 539: Applied Cryptography Lec 7: Message Authentication Codes

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Reading: https://joyofcryptography.com/pdf/chap10.pdf

Recap: PRG/PRF/PRP

- A PRG is a function $\mathbf{G}: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\ell}$
- A PRF is a function $\mathrm{F}: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \times \{0,1\}^{in} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{out}$
- A PRP is a function $\mathrm{F}: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \times \{0,1\}^{blen} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{blen}$

Recall: Encryption Basics & Terminology



- How to ensure that c was generated by Alice? (CCA-secure?)

Authentication

- What we are asking for is not to hide the ciphertext but to authenticate it: to ensure that it was generated by someone who knows the secret key.

Authentication: Challenge & Response

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

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- A MAC is like a signature that can be added to a piece of data, which certifies that someone who knows the secret key attests to this particular data

*A **message authentication code (MAC) scheme** for message space $\mathcal{M}$ consists of the following algorithms:*

- KeyGen: *samples a key.*
- MAC: *takes a key k and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ as input, and outputs a **tag** t. The* MAC *algorithm is deterministic.*

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- A MAC scheme is a secure MAC if the adversary knows valid MACs corresponding to various messages, she cannot produce a valid MAC for a different message.

Definition 10.2 (MAC security) *Let Σ be a MAC scheme. We say that Σ is a* **secure MAC** *if $\mathcal{L}^{\Sigma}_{\text{mac-real}} \approx \mathcal{L}^{\Sigma}_{\text{mac-fake}}$, where:*

$\mathcal{L}^{\Sigma}_{\text{mac-real}}$

$k \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{KeyGen}$

GETTAG$(m \in \Sigma.\mathcal{M})$:
  return $\Sigma.\text{MAC}(k, m)$

CHECKTAG$(m \in \Sigma.\mathcal{M}, t)$:
  return $t \stackrel{?}{=} \Sigma.\text{MAC}(k, m)$

$\mathcal{L}^{\Sigma}_{\text{mac-fake}}$

$k \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{KeyGen}$
$\mathcal{T} := \emptyset$

GETTAG$(m \in \Sigma.\mathcal{M})$:
  $t := \Sigma.\text{MAC}(k, m)$
  $\mathcal{T} := \mathcal{T} \cup \{(m, t)\}$
  return t

CHECKTAG$(m \in \Sigma.\mathcal{M}, t)$:
  return $(m, t) \stackrel{?}{\in} \mathcal{T}$

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- Quiz Sample: Is the below MAC secure?

Keygen:

$k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$

return k

MAC$(k, m_1 || \ldots || m_\ell)$: // each m_i is λ bits

$m^\star := 0^\lambda$

for $i = 1$ to ℓ:

$m^\star := m^\star \oplus m_i$

return $F(k, m^\star)$

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

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MAC$(k, m_1 || \ldots || m_\ell)$: // each m_i is λ bits

$t := 0^\lambda$

for $i = 1$ to ℓ:

$t := t \oplus F(k, m_i)$

return t