
# CSE 539: Applied Cryptography Week 10: Basic Crypto - Review

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Reading: https://joyofcryptography.com/pdf/chap15.pdf

#### Secret Sharing


- m Secret to be shared
- P Set of participants
- => A qualified subsets of can reconstruct m



- Formally, secret sharing scheme allows share a secret m among n parties such that for a fixed number t < n, the following conditions are satisfied.</li>
  - If < t parties get together, then they get no additional information about the secret.
  - If > t parties get together, then they can correctly reconstruct the secret

## Provable Security

"Real-vs-Random" Style of Security Definition



CPA: secure if Adversary chooses plaintext

• Cares about m ---> c direction


CCA: secure if Adversary gets all of Dec(ctxt)


Cares about c ---> m direction

#### Pseudorandom Generator

- A PRG is a function  $G: \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda + \ell}$
- Security:

Let  $G: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \to \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\ell}$  be a deterministic function with  $\ell > 0$ . We say that G is a **secure pseudorandom generator (PRG)** if  $\mathcal{L}_{prg-real}^G \approx \mathcal{L}_{prg-rand}^G$ , where:





### PRG/PRF/PRP

- A PRG is a function  $G: \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \to \{0, 1\}^{\lambda + \ell}$
- A PRF is a function  $F: \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \times \{0, 1\}^{in} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{out}$
- A PRP is a function  $F: \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \times \{0, 1\}^{blen} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{blen}$

## Message Authentication Code (MAC)

• A MAC is like a signature that can be added to a piece of data, which certifies that someone who knows the secret key attests to this particular data


• A MAC scheme is a secure MAC if the adversary knows valid MACs corresponding to various messages, she cannot produce a valid MAC for a different message.

#### Hash Function

• A hash function maps a message of an arbitrary length to a n-bit output  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^n$ 

- Collision resistance:
  - It should be hard to compute any collision  $x \neq x'$  such that H(x) = H(x')
- Second-preimage resistance (weak collision resistant):
  - Given x, it should be hard to compute any collision involving x. In other words, it should be hard to compute  $x' \neq x$  such that H(x) = H(x')

#### DHKE



Definition 14.2 The **discrete logarithm problem** is: given  $X \in \langle g \rangle$ , determine a number x such that  $g^x = X$ . (Discrete Log) Here the exponentiation is with respect to the multiplication operation in  $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$ .

## Public Key



